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Abstract In the past decade, crowdworking on online
labor market platforms has become an important source of
income for a growing number of people worldwide. This
development has led to increasing political and scholarly
interest in the wages people can earn on such platforms.
This study extends the literature, which is often based on a
single platform, region, or category of crowdworking,
through a meta-analysis of prevalent hourly wages. After a
systematic literature search, the paper considers 22 primary
empirical studies, including 105 wages and 76,765 data
points from 22 platforms, eight different countries, and
10 years. It is found that, on average, microtasks results in
an hourly wage of less than $6. This wage is significantly
lower than the mean wage of online freelancers, which is
roughly three times higher when not factoring in unpaid
work. Hourly wages accounting for unpaid work, such as
searching for tasks and communicating with requesters,
tend to be significantly lower than wages not considering
unpaid work. Legislators and researchers evaluating wages
in crowdworking need to be aware of this bias when
assessing hourly wages, given that the majority of literature
does not account for the effect of unpaid work time on
crowdworking wages. To foster the comparability of different research results, the article suggests that scholars
consider a wage correction factor to account for unpaid
work. Finally, researchers should be aware that
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1 Introduction
After years of annual double-digit growth rates (Kaganer
et al. 2013; ILO 2018), crowdworking has become a multibillion-dollar industry since its inception in the early 2000s.
The attractiveness of crowdworking lies in its business
model, which enables the near-instant worldwide matching
of workers and requesters on online labor market platforms
(Shafiei Gol et al. 2018; De Stefano 2015). Kässi et al.
(2021) estimate that 19 million people were active on
crowdworking platforms worldwide by the end of 2020,
with the number of active workers steadily increasing over
the years. A particularly strong increase in crowdworkers
recently occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic (Stephany et al. 2020), when many companies closed their
offices and working from home became mandatory, especially for the chronically ill. A similar development is also
likely to occur from migration due to armed conflicts,
which will require access to remote and easily accessible
jobs for many ex-employees (Lynn et al. 2021).
At first glance, as an outgrowth of the digital economy,
crowdworking provides considerable advantages for
workers and requesting companies. Workers are attracted
by low entry barriers, high flexibility in working hours and
location, and high autonomy in choosing their specific
tasks (Hara et al. 2018; Shafiei Gol et al. 2018). These
factors can not only promote social mobility, particularly in
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developing countries and for people with disabilities and
other minorities (Kittur et al. 2013; Adams and Berg 2017),
but also empower people who have been forced to migrate.
Requesters, which are often located in developed countries,
profit from remunerations far below the minimum wage in
their respective jurisdictions, because workers on internationally operating online labor platforms often come from
the Global South, where lower average wages are paid
(Agrawal et al. 2015).
However, remuneration in crowdworking has become a
source of discontent, due to perceived underpayment on the
worker side, regardless of the workers’ location (Whiting
et al. 2019). Workers from developed countries are dissatisfied with hourly wages far below the national average.
Workers from developing countries can earn wages above
the national average in their respective country (Heeks
2017; Berg and Rani 2021) but are often frustrated
knowing that their work would be better paid in the
requester’s country (Berg et al. 2018).
Investigating the hourly wages of crowdworkers is
therefore highly relevant, as evidenced by the growing
number of studies examining the remuneration on online
labor market platforms during the last years. However,
research often presents remuneration and work processes in
crowdworking only in a simplified and stylized way and
rarely differentiates the different categories of crowdwork
(Kittur et al. 2013; Jäger et al. 2019). However, the work
process often determines the way a worker is compensated
and the method of data collection researchers can use. The
respective data collection method, in turn, affects whether,
for example, unpaid work is taken into account, which can
bias the estimated wages. In addition, most studies examining wages on online crowdworking platforms focus on
one platform (Beerepoot and Lambregts 2015; Hara et al.
2019) or one region (Dunn 2017; Serfling 2018; BayudanDacuycuy and Kryz Baje 2021) and base their analysis on
only one method of data collection (Hara et al. 2018; Wood
et al. 2019a). The results of these studies may thus represent
non-representative outliers. By conducting a meta-analysis,
we overcome many of these limitations and increase the
transparency in the hourly wages crowdworkers earn.
We contribute to extant literature in at least three ways.
First, we investigate the different remuneration and work
processes for various categories of crowdwork. In doing so,
we highlight the difficulties and potential biases that various categories of crowdworking might pose to empirical
research. Second, we estimate average hourly wages for
microtasks and online freelancing using a meta-analysis.
Third, we investigate which factors influence the wages of
crowdworkers, especially the impact of unpaid labor on
hourly wages in crowdworking.
The structure of this article is as follows: Sect. 2 gives
an overview of the relevant literature and analyzes the
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remuneration and work processes for different categories of
crowdworking. In Sect. 3, we describe the data and methods, after which we report the results in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5,
we discuss the contributions and limitations of our analysis
and connect our results with current policy debate. Section 6 concludes the article.

2 Literature
2.1 The Crowdworking Wage Debate
Remuneration in crowdworking has attracted increasing
public attention, primarily through initiatives by trade
unions (Leimeister et al. 2016; DGB 2021), governmental
and non-governmental agencies (Dengler and Matthes
2015; FairCrowdWork 2017), and crowdworkers themselves (Salehi et al. 2015; Healy et al. 2020), often supported by research (Deng et al. 2016; Saito et al. 2019;
Whiting et al. 2019). Crowdworkers often discuss the
conditions on the crowdworking platform and the attractiveness of certain jobs in forums. Crowdworkers also
express concerns about this new world of work in academic
surveys. Unions and researchers then aggregate these
individual voices in best-practice frameworks and catalogs
of demands aimed at crowdworking platforms. The platform Fair Crowd Work (www.faircrowd.work), for example, offers trade union information and exchange on crowd,
app- and platform-based work. It also offers ratings of
working conditions on different online labor platforms
based on worker surveys. The Fairwork project (www.fair.
work) of the Oxford Internet Institute, University of
Oxford, and the Berlin Social Science Centre also evaluates
the working conditions of online labor platforms worldwide. In this way, unions in particular help overcome the
power asymmetry between workers and platforms, which
would otherwise leave an individual crowdworker with
minimal bargaining power (Kingsley et al. 2015; Auer
et al. 2021). A review of guidelines, codes of conduct, and
standards proposed by researchers, unions, and workers
shows that poor remuneration is the most frequently faced
problem of crowdworkers, often linked to demands for a
minimum wage (Heeks et al. 2021).
The response of crowdworking platforms to these
demands varies, with some platforms not even willing to
discuss them on a regular basis (Gegenhuber et al. 2021).
Most platforms disclaim responsibility for the remuneration of workers completing tasks on their platforms, as they
define themselves as mere intermediaries between requesters and workers (Cunningham-Parmeter 2019; Wei and
MacDonald 2021; Tay and Large 2022). The remuneration
of crowdworkers is then entirely at the discretion of the
requester, with the exception of some platforms that

L. Hornuf, D. Vrankar: Hourly Wages in Crowdworking..., Bus Inf Syst Eng 64(5):553–573 (2022)

implemented a minimum hourly wage, such as Upwork
($3) (Heeks 2017). Some companies have also signed selfcommitments to improve the working conditions on their
platforms (Funke and Picot 2021), voluntarily offer workers the opportunity to gain further qualifications through
tutorials, and actively encourage the exchange between
workers within the framework of best practices (Mrass
et al. 2018).
While legal scholars and legislators have focused on
aspects such as the applicability of labor law and social
security law to crowdworkers (De Groen and Maselli 2016;
Greef et al. 2017; Schoukens 2020; European Commission
2021), social scientists in particular have raised awareness
of wage levels in crowdworking. Initial research has mostly
focused on the requester side of online labor market platforms and, for example, determined the reservation wage
of workers completing microtasks (Horton and Chilton
2010). Moreover, platforms such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) not only are the subject of investigation but
also have become increasingly popular as a low-cost way
to obtain samples for empirical research projects. As wage
transparency has increased, with many empirical articles
informing workers and legislators about the wage levels of
crowdworkers, concerns have grown about underpayment
and exploitation of workers by both the private sector
(Paolacci et al. 2010; Nickerson 2013; Pallais 2014;
Brawley and Pury 2016) and the academic sector (Silberman et al. 2018; Shmueli et al. 2021).
2.2 Remuneration of Crowdworkers and Work
Processes
To understand how crowdworkers and requesters set
wages, we outline the different remuneration and work
processes in online crowdworking in Table 1, which gives
an overview of different crowdworking categories and
exemplary tasks and platforms. We base the categories and
definitions on the work of De Stefano (2015), Kuek et al.
(2015), and Boudreau and Lakhani (2013). Crowdworking
research often collects data on hourly wages using one of
two methods: surveys (e.g., Wood et al. 2019a; Giard et al.
2021) and technical data collection methods (e.g., Ipeirotis
2010; Hara et al. 2018). The overview of different
crowdworking categories shows how different work processes in microtasks, online freelancing, and crowd contests influence the choice of data collection methods.1 The
1

Other categories of crowdworking include crowd complementor
and collaborative community platforms (e.g., Boudreau and Lakhani
2013). To make the analysis concise, because jobs in collaborative
communities such as Innosabi or Wikipedia are often unpaid (Hornuf
and Jeworrek 2022) and because of the dearth of empirical studies on
wages for other categories such as crowd complementors, we limit
our analysis to microtasks, online freelancing, and crowd contests.
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more complex the work processes, especially if they
require a high level of offline work and thinking, the more
difficult it becomes to collect wages with technical methods. Researchers then must resort to surveys or rely on the
cooperation of platforms to share primary data.
Microtask completion involves the simplest remuneration and work process, which entails pay per task. Work
classified as microtasks often involves assignments that
take only seconds or a few minutes to complete and require
only little prior knowledge and rudimentary education
(Gao et al. 2015; Schmidt 2017; Durward et al. 2020).
Tasks range from data entry and transcription to image
recognition. The most notable platforms are MTurk and
Appen (Rani et al. 2021). It is precisely this category of
crowdwork that some scholars view as an extreme form of
Taylorism (Kittur et al. 2013; Aloisi 2015), defined as the
partitioning of a large, intellectually demanding task into
many small tasks, each of which can be completed with
minimal mental effort. Although the work process for
microtasks clearly contributes to the dehumanization of
workers (Kittur et al. 2013), the extremely short completion cycles per task and low skill requirements create
flexibility, enabling workers to fill otherwise unproductive
times of their day (Chandler and Shapiro 2016).
The work process for microtasks is extremely standardized and designed to minimize direct communication
between employees and customers, as Fig. 1 shows.
Workers are rarely invited by requesters to participate in
certain tasks (Berg 2016), instead mainly searching themselves for tasks posted by requesters. After workers
encounter a task they want to complete, they can accept the
task and either begin work directly or open additional
tasks, thereby preventing the already-opened task from
being assigned to another worker (Hara et al. 2018). A
common practice is to take on multiple jobs at once, as this
allows workers to reserve well-paying work. Nevertheless,
crowdworkers must complete each of the accepted tasks
within a deadline set by the requester; otherwise, the task
will be made available again to all workers (Toxtli et al.
2021). When a task is completed, workers wait for the
requester to accept their work to receive the promised
payment. However, on most platforms, requesters can
reject workers’ submitted tasks with minimal or no feedback (Lascău et al. 2022), though requesters are allowed to
keep the results of the rejected work (Beerepoot and
Lambregts 2015). Requesters benefit because, due to the
low remuneration per task, it is hardly worthwhile for
crowdworkers to invest their time in efforts to contact the
requesters to find out why their work was rejected (Berg
et al. 2018).
Although the remuneration and work process related to
microtasks allow for some variation as a result of rejections
and the simultaneous assignment of multiple tasks, they are
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Table 1 Categories of online crowdwork
Category

Description

Exemplary tasks

Exemplary platforms

Microtasks

Microtasks consist of small, repetitive tasks that require
minimal cognitive effort and little to no interaction with
requesters. Remuneration is earned per task.

Data entry, digitizing, image
recognition, surveys, web research

Clickworker, Crowdflower,
Microworkers, MTurk,
Prolific, Taskrabbit, Toloka

Online
Freelancing

Online freelancing tasks often require a distinct skill set
from workers. Usually, they require communication
with requesters. Remuneration is often paid per hour but
can also be earned per task.

Programming, translating, legal
advice, administration

Fiver, Freelanced, Freelancer,
oDesk, PeoplePerHour,
Upwork

Crowd
Contests

Crowd contest are competitions in which participants
submit their work. Interaction with requester is minimal.
Remuneration depends on the client that ranks the work
submitted. Therefore, a worker may not receive
remuneration, despite completing the work.

Designing a logo or a web page,
solving a company’s problem

110 designs, 99 designs,
DesignCrowd, GoPillar,
Hatchwise, HYVE, Topcoder

Crowd
Complementor

Crowd complementors offer products, software, or
services within an ecosystem built and maintained by a
company and thus generate value for the company, as
well as for users in that specific ecosystem. The
remuneration is usually subject to a fee charged by the
company providing the ecosystem or platform.

Developing an app, recording a
video, uploading a song or photo

Google Play Store, iTunes,
Soundcloud, YouTube

Collaborative
Community

Collaborative communities are often dedicated to a
greater purpose. Activities are often unpaid and
performed as a hobby, which instead of money pays off
in terms of recognition in the respective community.

Developing open-source software,
translating, helping other users on
the same platform

Apache, Translate, Facebook,
Wikipedia

The crowdworking categories are based on De Stefano (2015), Kuek et al. (2015), and Boudreau and Lakhani (2013). For an overview of the size
of individual platforms, see Kässi and Lehdonvirta (2018)

Fig. 1 Work process for microtasks. Dotted lines show possible divergences from the standard work process and might be platform specific

usually very similar and best suited for large-scale, standardized, technical data collection methods. On MTurk in
particular, researchers have created plugins and use them to
collect wage data. After a worker has installed one of the
available plugins, the plugin tracks the completion time per
task, the reward per task, and the acceptance rate, among
other statistics, and allows the estimation of an hourly
wage (Callison-Burch 2014; Hara et al. 2018). The early
plugins simply divided the remuneration per task by the
duration of the task to estimate an hourly wage. While
unpaid work was generally neglected, newer plugins also
include components of unpaid work in their calculations
and thus can provide a more accurate picture of hourly
wages (Hara et al. 2018; Toxtli et al. 2021).
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While researchers collect data from the plugins they
develop, various features encourage workers to install them
for free. First, the calculated hourly wage is displayed to
workers, helping them keep track of their productivity.2
Second, some plugins offer crowdworkers the ability to
rate each requester after completing a task. These ratings
are then aggregated and made available to other crowdworkers using the same plugin. In this way, workers can
potentially be warned about tasks that the community
considers unfair or unfeasible, reducing information
2

Keeping track of their productivity can affect the effectiveness of
crowdworkers’ work, which may lead to a systematic bias of the
wages collected through plugins.
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asymmetry on crowdworking platforms (Irani and Silberman 2013; Agrawal et al. 2015; Saito et al. 2019). Overall,
technically collected data on hourly wages related to
microtask platforms have the advantage of reflecting the
remuneration actually paid to crowdworkers; by contrast,
surveys can be subject to biases in human memory or
perception (Moore et al. 2000; Choi and Pak 2005).
In the second category of crowdworking, online freelancing, technical data collection methods are used less
frequently when examining wages, which are determined
by a somewhat more complex remuneration and work
process. Online freelancing entails assignments that can
take hours, days, and even weeks and need specialized
skills, such as programming knowledge, the comprehension of multiple languages, or legal expertise (Beerepoot
and Lambregts 2015). Exemplary tasks involve designing a
logo, developing a small computer program, or acting as
customer support for a requester’s product. As a result, a
disproportionate number of workers on online freelancing
platforms have earned at least a bachelor’s degree (Ross
et al. 2010; Bertschek et al. 2016; Rani et al. 2021). The
mismatch between the average education of the general
population and the people who work as online freelancers
is especially high in developing countries (Berg et al. 2018;
Braesemann et al. 2021). Because of the specific skill
requirements in online freelancing, building longer-term
relationships with workers who have done a good job in the
past is often advantageous for requesters. Longer-term
relationships between requesters and workers are therefore
more common in online freelancing than for microtasks
(Rani and Furrer 2019; Idowu and Elbanna 2021).
The work process often begins with a freelancer
searching for work or with an invitation from a requester
(see Fig. 2). Both cases lead to an offer from the online
freelancer for an hourly wage or a proposal for a total
remuneration (Prassl and Risak 2016). The requester can
directly reject or accept the offer, but usually the online
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freelancer and the requester further negotiate the remuneration (Beerepoot and Lambregts 2015; Fabo et al.
2017). In the case of online freelancing, the requester can
also reject the task after the work has been completed.
However, online freelancing platforms have a more
detailed dispute resolution system than microtask platforms
(Jarrahi et al. 2020; Lee and Cui 2020).
Because wages on online freelancing platforms are not
publicly negotiated and remuneration and work processes
are not as standardized as microtasks, researchers must
either examine wages through surveys with crowdworkers
or source the negotiated wages from the platforms themselves. This situation makes researchers dependent on the
willingness of crowdworkers to participate in surveys or
online labor platforms to participate in research projects
and to share primary data (Agrawal et al. 2015; Barzilay
and Ben-David 2017; Dunn 2017). Moreover, plugins that
collect wage data from online freelancers could provide
skewed wage estimates, as a greater proportion of unpaid
work goes undetected. Web-scraped data that investigate
the wages requested by the workers on their profile
potentially deliver biased estimates of realized wages,
because paid wages can be approximately 25% lower than
the remuneration initially asked for by the worker after
bargaining (Beerepoot and Lambregts 2015). Moreover,
another reason why web-scraped data potentially deliver
biased estimates is that workers requesting lower wages
might complete more tasks than workers that request
higher wages. It would therefore be a mistake to give equal
weight to each wage requested on a platform.
Obtaining wage data is even more difficult in crowd
contests, the third category of crowdworking. Up till now,
surveys have been the only way to determine the wages of
workers participating in crowd contests (De Groen and
Maselli 2016; Leimeister et al. 2016). While the work
process is easily explained and visualized in Fig. 3,
determining an hourly wage is more difficult. In crowd

Fig. 2 Work process in online freelancing. Dotted lines show possible divergences from the standard work process and might be platform
specific
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Fig. 3 Work process in crowd contests. Dotted lines show possible divergences from the standard work process and might be platform specific

contests, workers search for tasks on platforms such as 99
designs or HYVE and submit one or multiple solutions to
the contest. The complex tasks range from designing a logo
to solving a certain technical problem, which can require
specific skills in areas such as medicine, chemistry, or
engineering (Boudreau and Lakhani 2016). Payment is
based on a rank placement entirely determined by the
requester (Segev 2020). Depending on the platform, only
the worker with the best solution receives a remuneration
or the amount is distributed to the first places in descending
order (Rani et al. 2021). In this type of work, determining
when the crowdworker is actually working is particularly
difficult. For example, while the time required to draw a
logo can be measured, it is questionable whether a reliable
working time can be determined for complex problems that
require a high degree of mental work, such as developing a
better algorithm for film suggestions on Netflix.
Finally, crowd complementors, such as app developers,
often receive a fixed fee for their contribution that has been
ex ante defined by the platform. Collaborative community
platforms often involve innovation contests among regular
employees of a company or users of a product who receive
no additional compensation for their activities on the
platform (Boudreau and Lakhani 2013); as such, we do not
explicitly discuss these processes here.

3 Data and Method
3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis focuses on online crowdwork; we
do not examine location-based platforms such as Grubhub,
TaskRabbit, or Uber. To investigate wages in crowdworking, we conduct a meta-analysis in line with the
guidelines for Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic
Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) and use a slightly
modified template from Liberati et al. (2009). We provide a
flow diagram in Fig. 4 of the process of searching,
screening, and including or excluding studies in the
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empirical analysis. As a first step in our meta-analysis, we
conducted a systematic literature search from July 2020 to
March 2021, which we subsequently updated in March
2022, to identify suitable studies and hourly wages. Initial
keywords were extracted from ex ante known articles that
analyze hourly wages in crowdworking. With keyword
combinations such as ‘‘crowdwork per hour,’’ ‘‘crowdsource remuneration,’’ ‘‘crowdwork earnings,’’ and
‘‘crowdwork hourly,’’ (cf. Online Appendix A, available
online via http://link.springer.com) we then manually
searched the databases ScienceDirect, Scopus, Business
Source Premier, and ProQuest,3 which led to the identification of 432 potentially relevant studies and articles. In a
second step, we considered the first 50 search results on
Google Scholar for all the keywords and keyword combinations, which resulted in 424 additional studies found
during the systematic literature search. We judged studies
as potentially relevant if they were published in a journal,
as a report of a trade union, by a government authority or
non-governmental organization, or as a conference paper.
Of the 856 potentially relevant studies, 736 were irrelevant,
because they did not report a crowdworking wage in any
form. Consequently, we checked the remaining 120 studies
for eligibility and searched their respective reference lists,
to minimize the risk of missing an important observation.
To be included in the meta-analysis, publications needed
to meet two criteria. First, a relevant study had to state an
hourly wage or allow the calculation of an hourly wage on
the basis of primary data collected by the respective
authors of the study. If, for example, the average weekly
wage and the average weekly work hours were reported,
we calculated the hourly wage and included the study in the
meta-analysis. Second, a study must have specified the
number of data points on which the reported wage was
based. For 67 studies, the reported wages were collected by
other researchers and not by the respective authors. Eight
studies stated prizes for crowd contests without giving any
information on the work time spent for winning the contest.
3

Appendix A reports the full list of keyword combination.

Included

Eligibility

Screening

Identification
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Additional studies identified through
Google Scholar
(n=424)

Articles identified through database
and reference list searching
(n=432)

Studies after duplicates removed
(n=856)

Articles screened
(n=856)

Full-text articles assessed for
eligibility
(n=120)

Articles included in
quantitative analysis
(n=22)

Excluded after screening for
being irrelevant
(n=736)

Full-text articles excluded
(n=98)
Secondary data (n=67)
Wages not convertible to an hourly wage
format (n=10)
Wages in Crowdinnovation (n=8)
Wages for experiments (n=6)
Full-text not accessible (n=4)
Failure to contact authors (n=2)
Wages for location-based freelancing (n=1)

Fig. 4 PRISMA flow diagram. This flow diagram reports how the 22 primary studies in the meta-analysis were selected for inclusion. It is based
on the template of Liberati et al. (2009)

One study mixed survey responses from online freelancers with responses from freelancers working on location-based platforms (Rani and Furrer 2021) such as Uber
or Lieferando and therefore was excluded. Six studies
stated hourly wages the authors paid in experiments on
online labor market platforms. These studies did not have
the goal to collect primary data on crowdworking wages,
and therefore we did not include them in the meta-analysis.
We contacted the authors of five studies to obtain additional statistics and, in the end, considered three of the
studies. We were unable to obtain full text versions of four
studies. Finally, we calculated 10 hourly wages from other
statistics in the respective article. Seven observations initially measured in euros were converted into U.S. dollars,
with the exchange rate at the time of data collection of the
respective study.
Overall, 22 primary studies were eligible for inclusion in
the meta-analysis, in which we made 105 observations of
hourly wages. Observations are the average hourly wages
reported in a given study for a sample of crowdworkers.
The 105 average hourly wages that represent the observations are based on 76,765 data points. Each data point
represents either the response to a survey question about
the wage of a crowdworker or a wage collected via a
technical data collection method on the respective platform. Unless it was explicitly stated that unpaid work was
not considered, we decided to count observations from
surveys as considering unpaid work. We also decided to
include multiple observations per study in our dataset if,

for example, a study included paid and unpaid wages of the
same workers. We used this approach to prevent the loss of
additional information (Bijmolt and Pieters 2001); however, we did not conduct any empirical tests with overlapping information from the same study. The sample
includes between one and 22 hourly wages per study, while
the mean was five hourly wages per study. The average
number of data points per study was 3489 and varied
between 14 and 12,326 data points. We account for the
variance in data points per study in a weighting procedure,
which we describe in more detail in Sect. 3.3. Table 2
provides an overview of the included studies and the
regions and platforms they respectively cover.
Our meta-analysis includes at a minimum 15,580 unique
workers.4 This figure is the result of adding up data points
4

We cannot assume that the number of data points are identical to
the number of individual crowdworkers for three reasons. First,
crowdworkers often work on multiple platforms (Serfling 2018),
which allows them to answer surveys on different platforms and
potentially results in two separate data points for one crowdworker.
Second, even crowdworkers who only perform tasks on one platform
could potentially answer several of the included surveys, as the
surveys were conducted by different researchers and at different
points in time, which could again result in multiple data points per
worker. Arguably, given the large number of crowdworkers on a
platform such as MTurk, it seems rather unlikely that one crowdworker would undertake the same task of filling out a survey twice.
Third, technical data collection methods often estimate the hourly
wage by determining the wage per task and not per worker. Because
workers often complete multiple tasks on one platform, the number of
observed tasks is not equal to the number of observed workers.
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from different studies but considering only the study with
the most underlying data points in the respective country,
which hardly includes the same respondents. Two studies
in our sample use the same dataset from a 2017 International Labour Organization survey (Berg et al. 2018; Rani
and Furrer 2019). Moreover, Hara et al. (2018) and Hara
et al. (2019) use identical primary data sources for their
studies. We included all these studies in our meta-analysis
because they offer different insights into the same datasets.
For example, Berg et al. (2018) make a distinction between
the mean wage of American and Indian workers on MTurk,
and Rani and Furrer (2019) provide the mean wage for the
entire Asian region. As a general rule, when calculating
mean hourly wages in our meta-analysis, we made sure to
only include observations based on different primary
datasets. If we confronted multiple observations from the
same dataset (e.g., Hara et al. 2018, 2019), we used the
observation with the most underlying data points to
account for overrepresentation bias (Revelli and Viviani
2015).
In total, we obtained hourly wages for workers from
eight different countries,5 working on 22 of the most
common online labor market platforms6 (Kässi and
Lehdonvirta 2018), and 10 years.7 Scholars obtained
roughly three-quarters of the observations through technical data collection methods, and approximately one-fifth of
all observations account for unpaid work. Therefore, to the
best of our knowledge, our meta-analysis uses the most
comprehensive dataset of hourly wages in crowdworking in
the literature.
3.2 Variables
Table 3 provides an overview of the variables we use in our
empirical study. The variable Hourly Wage 2021 is the
variable of interest and measures the hourly wage of
crowdworkers adjusted for the year 2021 in U.S. dollars.
We adjust hourly wages to allow for meaningful comparisons between wages measured at different points in time,
using the inflation rate of the respective country where the
data was collected. If no inflation statistics for the specific
country or region were available, we considered the
international inflation rate (International Monetary Fund
2021).
5

China, Germany, India, Italy, Philippines, Serbia, Ukraine, and
United States.
6
Advego.ru, MTurk, Clickworker, CoContest, Crowd Guru, CrowdFlower, EPWK, fl.ru, Freelance.ru, Freelance.ua, Free-lance.ua,
Freelancehunt.com, Freelancer.com, Kabanchik.ua, k68, Microworkers, Prolific, Upwork.com, Weblancer.net, ZBJ, 680, and 99designs.
7
We obtained hourly wages for workers from 2009 to 2020;
however, we did not find any studies that collected data in 2011 and
2013.
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To calculate and weight the mean hourly wages for a
specific category of crowdwork and to make the respective
statistical adjustments (for more details, see Sect. 3.3.), we
obtained the number of data points (Data Points) and the
standard deviation (Wage Std. Dev.) for Hourly Wage
2021. For 11 hourly wages, we needed to calculate the
number of data points per observation, for example, from a
confidence interval or by percentages. Overall, we were
able to obtain or calculate the standard deviation for 85
hourly wages.
To enable a more nuanced analysis of wages for different forms of crowdworking, we created the categorical
variable Crowdworking Category, which equals 1 if the
observation results from microtasks, 2 if it results from
online freelancing, and 3 if it results from a crowd contest.
The coding of the data points is based on the framework
described in Sect. 2. In particular, we checked whether a
platform was previously assigned to one of the three categories in the literature (e.g., Berg et al. 2018; Schmidt
2016) and whether the platform itself states that it is active
in one of the three crowdworking categories. To show the
effect of unpaid work, we create the dummy variable
Involves Unpaid Work, which equals 1 if the reported
hourly wage in a study considers unpaid work and 0
otherwise.
To examine how wages are determined in the three
crowdworking categories and the extent to which the data
collection method influences the wages estimated, we
define the dummy variable Data Collection Method. This
variable equals 1 if the hourly wage was estimated through
a technical data collection method and 0 if the authors used
a survey.
3.3 Method
To analyze hourly wages in the different crowdworking
categories, we define five groups of hourly wages present
in empirical studies: the hourly wages of microtask workers, the hourly wages of microtask workers considering
unpaid work, the hourly wages of online freelancers, the
hourly wages of online freelancers considering unpaid
work, and the hourly wage of workers participating in
crowd contests considering unpaid work.8 Thus, we calculate average hourly wages for different crowdwork categories, while considering the effect of studies that account
only for paid work and those that also account for unpaid
work. We then calculate the mean and standard deviation
for each group to compare the resulting mean hourly
wages, using a two-sample t-test for unequal variances and
Satterthwaite’s (1946) formula as an approximation for the

8

No study considered only paid work for crowd contests.
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Table 2 Studies included in the empirical analysis
Study

Country/region

Platform

Wagesh

$4.60

No. of data points
Paid

Unpaid

–

381

Bayudan-Dacuycuy and Kryz Baje
(2021)

Philippines

–

Beerepoot and Lambregts (2015)

U.S

oDeska

$3.11–$26.66

925

–

Berg (2016)

U.S., India,
International

MTurk, CrowdFlower,b Prolific,
Microworkers

$1.90–$7.60

1056

1056

Berg et al. (2018)

U.S., India,
International

MTurk, CrowdFlower,b Prolific,
Microworkers

$2–$8.50

2020

2022c

De Groen et al. (2016)

Italy, Serbia

CoContestd

$3.50–$10.30

156

–

Dunn (2017)

U.S

$10.64–$15.29

12,932

–

Giard et al. (2021)

Germany

‘‘One of the largest online
platforms for work’’
‘‘Marketplace, Microtask’’

$6.16–$9.54

–

379

Hara et al. (2018)

International

MTurk

$3.13–$3.48

2666

5332

Hara et al. (2019)

U.S., India

MTurk

$2.48–$3.47

1113

–e

Ipeirotis (2010)

International

MTurk

$4.80

5147

–

Jiang et al. (2021)

International

MTurk

$5.12

–

260

Kaplan et al. (2018)

U.S

MTurk

$4.73–$5.12

–

720

Leimeister et al. (2016)

Germany

‘‘Microtask, marketplace,
design, testing’’

$5.94–$15.45

–

248
–

Litman et al. (2020)

International

MTurk

$4.59–$4.87

22,272

Pallais 2014

International

oDeska

$2.11–$2.20

3767

–

Rani and Furrer (2021)

Africa, Asia, Latin
America,

MTurk, CrowdFlower,b
Clickworker, Prolific,
Microworkers

$1.30–$5.80

1350

1350

Rani et al. (2021)

China, Ukraine,
International

f

$2.70–$11.20

1983

1988

c

Barzilay and Ben-David (2017)

U.S

Upwork

$17.26–$58.96

4324

–

Ross et al. (2010)

International

MTurk

$1.67–$1.92

–

1823g

Saito et al. (2019)
Wong et al. (2020)

International
International

MTurk
MTurk, Clickworker

$9.15
$5.56

83
801

–
–

Wood et al. (2019a)

Africa, Asia

‘‘On one of two leading
platforms’’

$3.66–$4.41

–

611

P

P

60,595

16,170

a

The two crowdworking platforms Elance and oDesk merged in 2013 and resulted in a new platform called Upwork

b

CrowdFlower was acquired by Appen in 2019

c

Dataset is from the ILO 2017 survey

d

CoContest Inc.’s contest website is now called GoPillar

e

Dataset is from Hara et al. (2018)

f

Freelancer, Upwork, 99designs, 680, EPWK, k68, ZBJ, Advego.ru, MTurk, fl.ru, Free-lance.ua, Freelance.ru, Freelance.ua, Freelancehunt.com,
Freelancer.com, Kabanchik.ua, Upwork.com, Weblancer.net, and Other

g

Authors state that their data are out of date and should no longer be used

h

Column contains the raw data extracted from each source. The raw data can be found in the respective source and is not adjusted for inflation

needed degrees of freedom. As sample sizes, we use the
respective number of hourly wages per group.
We use the variable Crowdworking Category and the
outlined method to examine the differences among wages
in microtasks, online freelancing, and crowd contests. We

further assess the effect of hourly wages earned by workers
in the categories microtasks and online freelancing conditional on whether the studies account only for paid work or
also consider unpaid work, using the dummy variable
Involves Unpaid Work. Finally, we examine the potential
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Table 3 Definition of variables
Variable

Definition

Data collection
method

Dummy variable that equals 1 if the data points of the respective observation were obtained through technical data
collection methods (e.g., a browser plugin) and 0 if the authors conducted a survey.

Crowdworking
category

This categorical variable indicates the category of crowdwork from which the wage was collected. It is equal to 1 if the
observation results from workers completing microtasks, 2 if it results from online freelancers, and 3 if it was collected for
a worker participating in a crowd contest.

Involves unpaid
work

Dummy variable that equals 1 if the respective observation considers unpaid work and 0 otherwise.

Hourly wage 2021

The average hourly wage in U.S. dollars that was observed in a given study and was consequently adjusted for the year
2021 using the inflation rate. Observations in currencies other than U.S. dollars were converted with the exchange rate at
the time the data in the study were collected. If the observation was not assigned to a specific region or country, the
international inflation rate was used (Source for inflation rates: International Monetary Fund).

Data points

Number of data points on which the hourly wages in a study are based. A data point can be the answer to a survey question
or the calculated hourly wage of a specific task, that was obtained through technical data collection methods.

Wage std. dev

Standard deviation of Hourly Wage and Hourly Wage 2021 that is reported in a given study or was obtained from the
authors of the study.

effect of the data collection method on the estimated hourly
wage using the dummy variable Data Collection Method.
To account for the sophistication of the respective
studies and the precision with which the hourly wages
are measured, we treat Hourly Wage 2021 as the quasieffect size in our meta-analysis and calculate weighted
means of hourly wages. First, we weight hourly wages
by the number of data points (Data Points) in the
respective study to account for the sophistication of the
particular study. Second, we weight our observations by
the inverted variance of an average hourly wage that was
1
reported in the respective study (WageStd:Dev:
2 ) to account
for various degrees of precision of the hourly wages.9
These two weights are commonly used in meta-analyses
(Schmidt and Hunter 2015; Lee et al. 2016) and allow us
to give greater weight to observations based on many
data points and observations with a small variance,
which presumably provides more consistent estimates of
the true hourly wage in the crowdworking population. In
what follows, we use the abbreviations n-weighted-mean
for hourly wages weighted by the number of observations and v-weighted-mean for hourly wages weighted by
the inverted variance, to distinguish the two ways of
weighting hourly wages in our sample. In line with prior
meta-analyses in the field of crowdworking (Spindeldreher and Schlagwein 2016), we calculate the mean of
Hourly Wage 2021 only if observations from at least five
independent studies are available.

9

Most studies report the standard deviation of the hourly wage,
which we then converted to the variance.
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4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We report the summary statistics for the full dataset and
independently for the subsamples of microtasks, online
freelancing, and crowd contests. Many observations come
from the crowdworking categories microtasks (n = 55) and
online freelancing (n = 47), while only three come from
the crowd contest category. Table 4 provides summary
statistics for the variables of interest. We find the observations in our dataset to be balanced in terms of the data
collection method, with roughly half the hourly wages in
the full dataset coming from surveys and the other half
from technical methods. However, hourly wages of online
freelancers are mainly measured through technical methods, while workers performing microtasks are often evaluated through surveys. While approximately one-third of
all observations account for unpaid work, only one-fifth of
the hourly wages of online freelancers account for unpaid
work.
We show the distribution of the hourly wages per year
for microtasks, online freelancing, and crowd contests in
Fig. 5. Circles indicate one observation – namely, an
average hourly wage reported in the respective study. The
larger the circles, the higher the number of data points on
which the wage is based. Notably, most observations fall in
the year 2016. By running a simple regression of hourly
wages on the year, we observe a negative but statistically
non-significant correlation. Thus, hourly wages remain
stable and even decline over time, which might reflect an
increase in competition among workers and platforms. We
again document the broad range of reported hourly wages
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Table 4 Summary statistics
Full dataset
Variable

Mean

SD

Subsample
microtasks (n = 55)

Subsample online
freelancing (n = 47)

Subsample crowd
contest (n = 3)

Min

Median

Max

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Data Collection Method

0.46

0.51

0

0

1

0.22

0.42

0.77

0.43

0

0

Category

1.50

0.56

1

1

3

–

–

–

–

–

–

0.37
13.92

0.49
16.01

0
1.48

0
5.97

1
85.11

0.51
4.43

0.50
2.46

0.17
25.17

0.38
18.31

1
11.80

0
2.47

731.10

1746.37

14

252

12,326

897.02

2195.43

579.60

1073.03

62.67

67.45

12.57

13.52

0.71

5.90

71.04

5.85

6.99

19.97

15.29

8.65

2.19

Involves Unpaid Work
Hourly Wage 2021
Data Points
Wage Std. Dev.

a

a

For the full dataset, we could measure standard deviations for only 86 of the 105 observations. For the subsample microtasks, we could measure
the standard deviation for 44 of the 55 observations. For the subsample online freelancing, we could measure the standard deviation for 41 of the
47 observations. For the subsample crowd contests, we could measure the standard deviation for 2 of the 3 observations

in Fig. 5 to highlight the necessity of assessing the various
categories of crowdworking.
4.2 Mean Hourly Wages
Although a multiple regression might be a natural method
to determine the factors influencing hourly wages, we do
not suggest that our empirical analysis reflects causal
relationships. We therefore decided to calculate and statistically test the differences between mean hourly wages
of the different groups. Table 5 reports the mean hourly
wages for the five groups of hourly wages present in
empirical studies. We present the results respectively by
adjusting wages by the number of data points in a study and
by accounting for unpaid work. In the case of a v-weighted
hourly wage for online freelancing considering unpaid
work, we could only find two independent studies, while
for workers participating in crowd contests, we had fewer
than five observations overall. In line with our inclusion
criteria, we therefore did not calculate either a v-weighted
mean hourly wage for freelancers accounting for unpaid
work or a mean hourly wage for workers participating in
crowd contests.
An overview of the estimated hourly wages for microtasks and online freelancers appears in Fig. 6. We find that
hourly wages of workers completing microtasks range from
$3.78 to $5.55 per hour, depending on the weighting
method and whether unpaid work is taken into account.
With up to $20.88 per hour, we find that the calculated
hourly wage of online freelancers in our meta-analysis
significantly exceeds that of workers doing microtasks
when unpaid work is neglected, as Panels A and B (line 1)
of Table 6 show. We also find that the v-weighted means
are always lower than their n-weighted counterparts. The
difference between the n- and v-weighted mean is especially high for online freelancers, which can be partly

attributed to the observations stemming from the studies of
Barzilay and Ben-David (2017) and Dunn (2017). Both
studies report relatively high wages, but also high standard
deviations, even though their hourly wage estimations are
based on thousands of data points. As a result, the hourly
wages from these studies are weighted more heavily for the
n-weighted mean than for the v-weighted mean. This
example highlights the importance of using both the
number of underlying data points and the inverted variance
as weights to estimate the true hourly wage in
crowdworking.
Furthermore, we find that for microtasks, almost three
out of four datapoints are collected via plugins, while only
one in four datapoints for online freelancers is extracted
through such technical data collection methods. We find
that wages estimated by technical data collection are higher
than wages collected through surveys, as the comparison of
the mean hourly wages in Panels A and B (line 5) of
Table 6 shows. Studies such as that of Bayudan-Dacuycuy
and Kryz Baje (2021), which had direct access to primary
platform data, show that even more complex remuneration
and work processes can be measured through technical
methods, especially when companies grant researchers
access to their platform. However, it should be noted that
these often better-paid online freelancing jobs also entail
more unpaid work, which is often neglected by this type of
data collection.
4.3 Factors Determining the Hourly Wage
of a Crowdworker
In the reviewed studies, we find four factors that might
determine the heterogeneity of the observed wages. These
factors are the skills of a specific worker, sample differences in crowdworker demographics, the current state of
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80

564

v-weighted

20

20.88

12.13

10

Mean Hourly Wage [$]

Mean Hourly Wage [$]
40
20
60

30

n-weighted

5.55

4.97

4.87
3.78

0

0

4.07

2010

2015
Year
Microtasks

Online Freelancing

Microtasks

2020

the crowdworking market, and whether or not a study
accounts for unpaid work.
First, the skills of a crowdworker consist of at least two
elements: the acquired skills that set the worker apart from
others (Bayudan-Dacuycuy and Kryz Baje 2021; Braesemann et al. 2021) and the experience gained by spending

Microtasks

Online Freelancing

Involves unpaid work
No
Yes

Crowd Contest

Fig. 5 Scatterplot of wages from 22 primary studies. The size of each
circle represents the number of observations relative to the other
observations

Online Freelancing

Fig. 6 Comparison of calculated mean hourly wages

time on crowdworking platforms. While labor economics
suggest that better-skilled workers earn higher wages,
research has also shown that crowdworkers become more
efficient over time, enabling them to earn higher wages
(Rani and Furrer 2019; Sannon and Cosley 2019). For
example, in the crowdworking category of microtasks,
workers use plugins to become more efficient, or they

Table 5 Mean hourly wages
Category

Not considering unpaid work

Considering unpaid work

$20.88

$4.87

(SD: $14.31)

(SD: $2.60)

(Data points: 23,931)

(Data points: 3310)

(Observations: 39)

(Observations: 8)

$5.55

$4.07

(SD: $1.05)

(SD: $1.55)

(Data points: 34,045)

(Data points: 8452)

(a) n-weighted, adjusted 2021
Online freelancing

Microtasks

Crowd contest
(b) v-weighted, adjusted 2021
Online freelancing

(Observations: 15)

(Observations: 18)

–a

–a

$12.13

–a

(SD: $7.87)
(Data points: 20,164)
(Observations: 37)
Microtasks

Crowd contest

$4.97

$3.78

(SD: $2.04)

(SD: $3.35)

(Data points: 29,447)

(Data points: 6550)

(Observations: 21)

(Observations: 13)

–a

–a

Data points is the number of data points used to calculate the respective mean hourly wage. Each data point represents either the response to a
survey question about the wage of a crowdworker or a wage collected via a technical data collection method on the respective platform
Observations is the number of observations used to calculate the respective mean hourly wage. Each observation is the average hourly wages
reported in a given study for a sample of crowdworkers
a

Less than 5 independent observations
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Table 6 Comparison of means
Comparison

Mean

Difference

No. of data points

No. of observations

Panel A: Comparison of n-weighted means, adjusted 2021
(1) Online freelancing paid/microtasks paid

$20.88

- $15.33***

23,931/34045

39/15

(2) Online freelancing unpaid/microtasks unpaid

$4.87

- $0.80

3310/8452

8/18

(3) Online freelancing paid/online freelancing unpaid

$20.88

- $16.01***

23,931/3310

39/8

(4) Microtask paid/microtasks unpaid

$5.55

- $1.48***

1050/1550

15/18

(5) Technical/survey

$12.54

- $7.60***

52,476/15144

42/41

- $7.16***

20,164/29447

37/21

1988/6550

3/13

Panel B: Comparison of v-weighted means, adjusted 2021
(1) Online freelancing paid/microtasks paid

$12.13

(2) Online freelancing unpaid/microtasks unpaid

a

(3) Online freelancing paid/online Freelancing unpaid

a

(4) Microtasks paid/microtasks unpaid
(5) Technical/survey

$4.97
$5.51

- $1.19
- $1.70**

20,164/1988

37/3

29,447/6550
43,562/11280

21/13
39/30

*p \ 0.10%, **p \ 0.05, ***p \ 0.01
a

Less than five independent observations

search in forums to find better-paying jobs (Kingsley et al.
2015; Silberman and Irani 2015). In online freelancing,
workers often build a reputation, which also allows them to
earn higher wages (Aleksynska et al. 2019; Haidar and
Keune 2021).
The second factor determining hourly wages is sample
differences in crowdworker demographics. Age and
gender in particular play a major role in the remuneration
of crowdworkers. Younger workers earn more than their
older colleagues, and men earn more than women (Litman
et al. 2020; Caro et al. 2021). With regard to age, younger
workers are less likely to be married or have children,
which may give them more flexibility in working hours
(Litman et al. 2020; Wood et al. 2019a). In general, women
are less experienced in crowdworking and also more
involved in care work (Litman et al. 2020). As a result,
they must often take on less favorable tasks at off-peak
times, because most tasks are posted during the working
hours of large requesters, such as those in the United States
(Berg et al. 2018; Gerber 2022). The location of crowdworkers is also important because high-paying tasks are
often restricted to workers in a specific country, which is
mostly in the developed world (Lehdonvirta et al. 2019;
Rani and Furrer 2021). In 86% of cases in which a specific
country is requested, international requesters ask for U.S.
workers (Difallah et al. 2015). Health problems can also
affect the pace of work completion and, thus, the hourly
wage (Caro et al. 2021).
The third factor affecting hourly wages is the current
supply and demand for tasks and workers (Nikzad 2017;
Bayudan-Dacuycuy and Kryz Baje 2021; Zhang et al.
2022). Muszyński et al. (2021) contend that the smoothing
of labor supply and demand through employer–employee
relationships is absent in crowdworking. Workers

completing microtasks, in particular, are vulnerable to low
hourly wages caused by labor oversupply, as microtasks
require few skills and therefore have a low barrier to entry
(Braesemann et al. 2021). For many crowdworkers, however, microtasks could represent a gap-filling activity that
is easily carried out between other activities and which
therefore also pays a comparatively low wage (Teevan
2016; Newlands and Lutz 2021). During the COVID-19
pandemic, increasingly more people turned to crowdwork
as a source of income, thereby lowering average wages
through increased competition and supply (Stephany et al.
2020; Braesemann et al. 2021; Muszyński et al. 2021).
However, even before the pandemic, Graham and Anwar
(2019) identified a large oversupply of labor on one of the
largest platforms for online freelancers worldwide (Kässi
and Lehdonvirta 2018). Although demand for online
crowdworkers has now exceeded pre-pandemic levels
(Stephany et al. 2020), an oversupply of workers for most
tasks is still likely.
Finally, the hourly wage also depends on how much
unpaid work is done and whether the empirical studies
account for unpaid work. Unpaid work involves communicating with requesters, searching for tasks, building a
reputation, writing reviews, and beginning tasks that the
worker will not complete (Berg et al. 2018; Pulignano and
Marà 2021; Rani and Furrer 2021; Toxtli et al. 2021;
Lascău et al. 2022). Rejected work also increases the extent
of unpaid work. Depending on the platform, up to 15% of
all work is rejected (Berg et al. 2018). The fact that on most
platforms requesters are allowed to keep the results of
rejected work while the worker receives no remuneration
for the task at hand is a clear indication of the prevailing
power asymmetry between workers and requesters
(Beerepoot and Lambregts 2015; Berg et al. 2018; Lascău
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et al. 2022). Research also suggests that non-native English
speakers take more time to complete a task (Toxtli et al.
2021) and have a higher rejection rate, as misunderstandings more often lead to low-quality results (Goodman et al.
2013; Chandler and Shapiro 2016).
The estimated amount of unpaid work in crowdworking
varies depending on the category of crowdwork. Rani et al.
(2021) report that 38% of all work done on freelancing
platforms and 33% of work done in microtasking is
uncompensated. In another study, Rani and Furrer (2021)
estimate that 23% of all work is unpaid, while Wood et al.
(2019a) report that 39% of the work done by crowdworkers
is unpaid. We confirm these estimates at least for microtasks, with between 23 and 26% (Table 6, Panels A and B)
of all work being unpaid in our aggregated data.

5 Discussion
Our main results show estimated hourly wages of less than
$6 for workers completing microtasks when unpaid labor is
not accounted for and approximately $4 when this is the
case. For the more diverse domain of online freelancing,
we find hourly wages as high as $20.88 per hour, but our
estimates fall off sharply when we account for unpaid
work, to an average hourly wage of $4.87. These results are
consistent with previous research, which estimates that the
proportion of unpaid work is higher for online freelancers
than for microtasks (Pulignano and Marà 2021; Wood et al.
2019a). We also show how the different complexity of
remuneration and work processes can dictate the choice of
data collection method in crowdworking research. In this
context, we again emphasize that unpaid work is usually
neglected when technical data collection methods are used
and call for future research to improve these methods in
that respect.
We also note that skills are not the only relevant factor
in determining the hourly wage a crowdworker can earn.
Using microtasks as gap fillers (Bayudan-Dacuycuy and
Kryz Baje 2021) helps answer the question of why some
crowdworkers are not systematically moving into the
higher-paying domain of online freelancing by learning
required skills (Stephany 2021). Nonetheless, some
crowdworkers do indeed use low-entry tasks to build
skills necessary to transition to online freelancing (Kuek
et al. 2015). Importantly, much of the work done is
completed by a small proportion of skilled microtask
workers (Chandler and Shapiro 2016; Codagnone et al.
2016) who can earn incomes well in excess of local
minimum wages (Heeks 2017; Berg and Rani 2021). For
example, constantly checking profiles of known requesters
for new assignments allows these well-trained microtask
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workers to earn wages closer to an average of $11 per
hour (Hara et al. 2018).
5.1 Contribution to Current Policy Debates
Policy debate over the hourly wages paid in crowdworking
is ongoing (Berg 2016; Leimeister et al. 2016; O’Higgins
and Caro 2022). We consider three discourses in this
debate originally identified by Greef et al. (2017). First,
scholars have engaged in discourse about the general
transformation of work, from location-based work to online
web-based platforms (Rani et al. 2021). Second, there is
discourse on growth and competition, which evaluates the
future potential of online labor markets, but also the
already-fierce competition between workers for wages and
completion times on crowdworking platforms (Pongratz
and Bormann 2017). The third discourse centers on the
issue of social security and the participation of workers in
shaping the future of their work environment. Here, discourse involves how and in what form agencies such as
trade unions can condemn but also change poor working
conditions, such as the lack of social security (Johnston and
Land-Kazlauskas 2019).
Our study contributes to the general discourse about the
transformation of work, especially in the field of the everincreasing information asymmetry in crowdworking
(Agrawal et al. 2015; Aloisi 2015). While online labor
platforms monitor workers in ways often unthinkable in
traditional work environments (Wood et al. 2019b), the
workers themselves are left with third-party browser plugins, to track their remuneration and performance. In most
cases, legislators and trade unions do not have access to
these kinds of technically obtained data and therefore must
use surveys to monitor hourly wages and other important
key figures of work (Serfling 2018). For more established
industries, researchers can often also rely on official
statistics collected by government agencies, which is not
yet the case for crowdworkers. Some scholars therefore
suggest granting legislators access to anonymized transaction data from online labor platforms, to help policy
makers regulate the crowdworking market (Heeks 2017;
European Commission 2021). We contribute to this debate
by increasing the transparency in mean hourly wages,
based on multiple studies and data collection methods.
Regarding the data collection method, researchers should
be aware of how different methods can affect their results.
We find large differences between hourly wages estimated
through surveys and technical data collection methods.
Future research should consider the effect of unpaid work
on estimated hourly wages, for example, in the form of a
correction subtracted from the estimated hourly wage that
only accounts for paid work. Projects such as Fair Crowd
Work and Fairwork could quantify the proportion of unpaid
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work and calculate and publish a correction factor
accordingly for each platform. As we show in our study,
the effects of unpaid work are significant and should not be
neglected.
With the mean hourly wages reported in our study, we
also contribute to the discussion on the organizational
transformation of the relationship between online labor
market platforms and crowdworkers (Dengler and Matthes
2015; Drahokoupil and Fabo 2016). Because of the low
wages paid to workers completing microtasks, research
often argues that these workers are overdue for legal
classification as salaried employees (Berg 2016), as the
dependency between workers and platforms is partly
comparable to dependent employees (Preis 2016; Leist
et al. 2017). Under current laws, however, the classification
of crowdworkers into the common categories of labor law
is difficult and controversial (see, e.g., Otey v. CrowdFlower, Inc. 2013). In addition to these problems, regulating and monitoring the crowdworking market is difficult
for legislators because of the transnational nature of the
markets, the heterogeneity in platforms, and the differing
dependencies between workers and platforms (Greef et al.
2017; Serfling 2018). In our study, we deal with this
heterogeneity by analyzing the specific area of online
crowdworking, which allows us to make meaningful distinctions among three categories of crowdwork. In these
categories, we find significant wage differences, which
again highlights the importance of a precise definition of
the investigated categories of crowdworking in future
research and the policy debate. Especially in the field of
crowd contests, data on wages are sparse and thus offer an
important avenue for future research. Empirical studies
would also benefit from using data collection methods
other than surveys, which have so far been the only method
to understand the complex remuneration and work process
in crowd contests.
We also contribute to the second discourse focusing on
the growth and development of online labor markets, which
is strongly connected with the call for additional research
in the field of crowdworking (Greef et al. 2017; Maier and
Viete 2017). With the novel dataset used in this study, we
aggregate information on the main motivator of crowdworkers (Kaufmann et al. 2011; Goodman et al. 2013;
Lioznova et al. 2020) and contribute to existing efforts to
extend the database on online crowdworking. Furthermore,
the results of our analysis could serve as a preliminary
benchmark for future studies examining the wages of new
online workers in the wake of global pandemics and
migration movements.
Our findings are especially relevant to the debate on the
social security and participation of crowdworkers in decision-making processes regarding the platforms on which
they work (Preis 2016). In most countries and on the
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majority of platforms, neither social security nor options
for participation exist. Many researchers have therefore
criticized the working conditions in crowdworking, with
some even describing them as precarious (Kittur et al.
2013; Schriner and Oerther 2014; Hara et al. 2018; Whiting
et al. 2019). As workers are mostly not employed by the
platforms, but labeled ‘‘contractors’’ or ‘‘freelancers,’’
online labor market platforms are not responsible for paid
leave, maximum working hours, or mandatory breaks
(Barzilay and Ben-David 2017).
Because of unclear governance mechanisms and information asymmetries, platforms are particularly prone to
contribute to precarious work conditions (Cutolo and
Kenney 2019; Khovanskaya et al. 2019; Gegenhuber et al.
2021). In this case, trade unions can act not only as strong
negotiators on behalf of the workers, as in traditional labor
markets, but also as an institution that could facilitate the
necessary communication and exchange between workers
(Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas 2019). With our metaanalysis, we substantiate the criticism of low wages, at
least in the area of microtasks, for which we consistently
find mean hourly wages of under $6 per hour. Given this
mean wage and the lack of health insurance for the
majority of workers, it is clear why many workers have
called for better or even any social benefits (Wood et al.
2019b). In online freelancing, however, we calculate mean
hourly wages, which are much higher than those for
workers completing microtasks, with calculated mean
wages up to $20.88 per hour. However, when considering
unpaid work, the wages of online freelancing are relatively
low.
It is also important to note that these wages should not
be considered only from a Western and industrialized
country perspective (Casilli 2016; Elbanna and Idowu
2021). Given the prices of particular goods at different
locations, it is understandable why an hourly wage of $1–
$2 is more attractive to a Kenyan than a U.S. citizen (De
Groen and Maselli 2016; Bayudan-Dacuycuy and Kryz
Baje 2021; Berg and Rani 2021). Considering the concept
of purchasing power parity, Beerepoot and Lambregts
(2015) determined higher relative wages for online workers
from India and the Philippines than U.S. workers. However, with around two-thirds of all observations in our
meta-analysis being from U.S. workers, crowdworking
research seems to suffer from white, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) sample bias (Henrich
et al. 2010).10 Therefore, to counter criticism of the limited
external validity, future research could also more
10
By contrast, Rani and Furrer (2021) investigate microtask workers
from developing countries; Wood et al. (2019a) also examine workers
from Sub-Saharan Africa, and Beerepoot and Lambregts (2015)
assess workers from the Philippines.
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extensively examine crowdworkers from the Global South
and migrant crowdworkers.
In recent years, platforms’ governance has also
improved, such as through the introduction of a minimum
hourly wage on oDesk (now Upwork) (Heeks 2017).
Whereas Hanrahan et al. (2021) observed an increase in
wages from 2018 to 2019, we find a small, albeit statistically non-significant, decrease in hourly wages in our
dataset. The difference might be due to the inclusion of
many observations that take unpaid work into account,
while Hanrahan et al.’s results are based on observations
only considering paid work. In principle, the advantages of
crowdworking should not be neglected. For example, the
high degree of spatial and temporal flexibility when completing work as a crowdworker is one of the greatest
advantages of crowdwork (Brandt et al. 2016; D’Cruz and
Noronha 2016; Berg et al. 2018). Thus, crowdworking
could potentially facilitate the participation of people with
disabilities or individuals with care obligations in the labor
market (Adams and Berg 2017; Hara et al. 2019).
5.2 Limitations
Any meta-analysis can suffer from publication bias; that is,
some studies are not published because of the non-significance or direction of their results and therefore cannot be
considered. For our meta-analysis, common methods for
discovering publication bias, such as funnel plots (Elvik
1998; Ahmed et al. 2012), are not adequate empirical
techniques because we do not calculate effect sizes such as
Hedges’s g or Cohen’s d but rather calculate average
hourly wages as a quasi-effect size (Song et al. 2000).
Not using the standard effect sizes and simply considering the reported hourly wages has two implications. First,
we do not expect a symmetric distribution of hourly wages,
which we would expect when measuring effect sizes and
reporting a funnel plot. Previous research has shown that
the distribution of wages on crowdworking platforms is
right skewed (Berg 2016; Adams and Berg 2017; Kaplan
et al. 2018). In other words, the majority of workers
completing microtasks and online freelancers earn only
small wages, while few earn wages that are many times
higher than the average hourly crowdworking wage. We
found that the distribution of hourly wages in our data
sample was right skewed as well, which indicates that we
observe a representative distribution. Second, whether the
reason for publication bias regarding effect sizes can be
transferred to the estimation of hourly wages is questionable. Publication bias frequently occurs when only statistically significant results are published, while research
resulting in statistically non-significant results remains
unpublished (Bozarth and Roberts 1972). In our case, the
risk of not reporting non-significant results should be
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minimal, because most studies in the domain of crowdworking do not conduct tests for statistical differences in
wages.
Another problem when conducting a meta-analysis is
the potential lack of internal validity (Brutus et al. 2013);
that is, a single study should not dominate hourly wage
estimates. To be able to average out study-specific effects,
such as the particular sample or the data collection method
used, we only calculated an hourly wage if at least five
independent studies were available in our meta-analysis
(Spindeldreher and Schlagwein 2016).
Furthermore, research on crowdworking wages faces a
high degree of heterogeneity, especially when considering
online freelancing, as the high standard deviation for the
mean hourly wage evidences. Our mean hourly wages are
therefore only valid for a specific category of crowdwork
and not crowdwork in general. We tried to counteract this
problem by thoroughly separating crowdwork into three
prominent categories. For microtasks, which tend to be
homogeneous, standard deviations in our sample are substantially smaller, which indicates a more precise estimate
of mean hourly wages. To make wages more comparable
over time, we adjusted them for inflation, but we recognize
that wage bargaining and wage increases may not always
follow changes in consumer prices (Blanchflower et al.
2017; Lübker 2020), especially in the domain of crowdworking. If so, we would have overestimated the inflationadjusted wages in our meta-analyses at best, because wages
in crowdworking have not risen as fast as inflation rates. If
workers or unions perceive wages as unethical and too low,
they might in fact be even lower if wages have not
increased with the inflation rate.11 Nevertheless, the inflation rates in Europe and the United States were low during
the observation period of our meta-analysis (Forbes et al.
2021; Koester et al. 2021). Finally, meta-analyses include
older studies by nature, even though the results obtained in
a particular study may not be fully comparable with those
from more recent periods.

6 Conclusion
This meta-analysis investigates 105 mean hourly wages in
crowdwork that were reported in 22 different studies. We
extend the literature by estimating the mean hourly wages
for different categories of crowdworking, while also considering the method of data collection and the effect of
unpaid work. Our investigation of mean hourly wages is
11

Furthermore, arguments that workers in surveys erroneously
overestimate their hourly wages to protect their self-image (Mazar
et al. 2008) are hardly valid, as research has shown that crowdworkers
are well aware of their often low hourly wages (D’Cruz and Noronha
2016; Whiting et al. 2019).
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not limited to a single platform, region, or data collection
method, which further raises transparency for workers,
researchers, and legislators (De Groen et al. 2016; Litman
et al. 2020; Wong et al. 2020). Our results, to our knowledge, are based on the most comprehensive dataset on
hourly wages in crowdworking in recent literature. We
show that working on microtasks results in wages ranging
from $3.78 to $5.55 per hour on average. Online freelancers earn $4.87 to $20.88 per hour on average, which is
up to three times more than microtask workers.
Future experimental research should test the influence
of data collection methods that might result in self-reporting bias in crowdworking wages. For example,
researchers could monitor crowdworkers’ hourly wages
through a plugin and then ask them about their earnings.
Quantifying the potential difference between the different
methods of data collection is especially important when
evaluating the wages of online freelancers, as the unpaid
portion of the work is likely to be higher and could be
underestimated. Policy makers should be aware that the
use of surveys instead of technical data collection
methods could change the estimation of wages. In recent
literature, the method of data collection strongly depends
on the willingness of the specific crowdworking platform
to share its data with researchers (Agrawal et al. 2015;
Bertschek et al. 2016; Barzilay and Ben-David 2017). If
an online freelancing platform decides not to share its
data or only shares out-of-date data, surveys become the
only option to investigate the current wages of workers.
Surveys could also turn out to be the only viable option
to examine wages on crowd contest platforms, a field in
which estimates of hourly wages are sparse (De Groen
and Maselli 2016).
As we found a significant difference in wages accounting and not accounting for unpaid work, we suggest that
researchers investigating hourly wages in crowdworking in
the future always report an hourly wage that also accounts
for unpaid work. Because most researchers assume that
one-third to one-half of the work time is unpaid (Berg et al.
2018; Rani et al. 2021), which is in line with our metaanalysis results, a wage correction factor that does take
unpaid work into account should be around 20–33%. Such
a wage correction factor for hourly wages that considers
unpaid components would make hourly wages from different crowdworking studies more comparable. Furthermore, we encourage researchers to assess crowdworkers
from countries other than the United States. Undertaking a
broader comparison of wages between different regions
and considering the prices of goods and services at different locations might provide a more refined picture of
crowdworking as a new online labor market.
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Jahrbücher
Für
Nationalökonomie
Und
Statistik
239(3):565–597. https://doi.org/10.1515/jbnst-2018-0019
Rani U, Furrer M (2021) Digital labour platforms and new forms of
flexible work in developing countries: algorithmic management
of work and workers. Compet Change 25(2):212–236. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1024529420905187
Revelli C, Viviani JL (2015) Financial performance of socially
responsible investing (SRI): what have we learned? A metaanalysis. Bus Ethics Eur Rev 24(2):158–185. https://doi.org/10.
1111/beer.12076
Ross J, Irani L, Silberman MS, Zaldivar A, Tomlinson B (2010) Who
are the crowdworkers? In: CHI ‘10 extended abstracts on human
factors in computing systems. ACM, New York, pp 2863–2872.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1753846.1753873
Saito S, Chiang CW, Savage S, Nakano T, Kobayashi T, Bigham JP
(2019) TurkScanner: predicting the hourly wage of microtasks.
In: Proceedings of the 28th international conference on world
wide web. ACM, New York, pp 3187–3193. https://doi.org/10.
1145/3308558.3313716
Salehi N, Irani LC, Bernstein MS, Alkhatib A, Ogbe E, Milland K,
Clickhappier (2015) We are dynamo. In: Proceedings of the 33rd
annual ACM conference on human factors in computing
systems. ACM, New York, pp 1621–1630. https://doi.org/10.
1145/2702123.2702508
Sannon S, Cosley D (2019) Privacy, power, and invisible labor on
Amazon Mechanical Turk. In: Proceedings of the 2019 CHI
conference on human factors in computing systems. ACM, New
York, pp 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1145/3290605.3300512
Satterthwaite FE (1946) An approximate distribution of estimates of
variance components. Biom Bull 2(6):110–114. https://doi.org/
10.2307/3002019
Schmidt FA (2017) Conclusion: towards an ethics of creative
crowdwork. In: Schmidt FA (ed) Crowd design: from tools for
empowerment to platform capitalism. Birkhäuser, Zurich,
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